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 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse 
Debate on 20 December 2018 
 
Summary 
 
On 20 December 2018, the House of Lords is scheduled to debate the 
following motion moved Lord Campbell-Savours (Labour) “that this House 
takes note of the remit of, and arrangements for the handling of evidence by, 
the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse”. 
 
The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) is an independent 
inquiry established in February 2015 under the provisions of the Inquiries 
Act 2005 (the 2005 Act), having its origins in a non-statutory inquiry established 
in July 2014. The IICSA’s terms of reference are: 
 
To consider the extent to which state and non-state institutions have 
failed in their duty of care to protect children from sexual abuse and 
exploitation; to consider the extent to which those failings have since 
been addressed; to identify further action needed to address any failings 
identified; to consider the steps which it is necessary for state and 
non-state institutions to take in order to protect children from such 
abuse in future; and to publish a report with recommendations. 
 
It is chaired by Professor Alexis Jay OBE and is structured around three core 
projects: the truth project, the research project and the public hearings project. 
The latter of which resembles a conventional public inquiry in which witnesses 
give evidence on oath and are subject to questioning. In its work the committee 
will be undertaking 13 investigative strands, examining both themes and 
institutions. The IICSA has the power to compel individuals to give evidence 
where it deems it appropriate, as provided for under the 2005 Act and the 
Inquiry Rules 2006 (the Rules). 
 
This Lords Library Briefing provides background information on the IICSA, 
followed by information on the provisions of the 2005 Act and the Rules, with a 
focus on the taking and handling of evidence by statutory inquiries. The briefing 
also examines the House of Lords Inquiry Act 2005 Committee’s post-
legislative scrutiny work and how the IICSA has approached the handling of 
evidence in its work.  
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1. Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse: Announcement 
and Background 
 
The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) was originally 
announced as a non-statutory panel inquiry by Theresa May, the then Home 
Secretary, on 7 July 2014.1 Mrs May argued that this non-statutory form 
would allow the IICSA to begin its work more quickly and would be less 
likely to prejudice any ongoing investigations: 
 
The inquiry will, like the inquiries into Hillsborough and the murder of 
Daniel Morgan, be a non-statutory panel inquiry. That means that it 
can begin its work sooner and, because the basis of its early work will 
be a review of documentary evidence rather than interviews with 
witnesses who might themselves still be subject to criminal 
investigations, it will be less likely to prejudice those investigations.2 
 
Mrs May also stated the Government would be prepared to establish the 
inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005, if the inquiry panel’s chair believed it 
necessary.3 On 4 February 2015, the Home Secretary announced this 
change, saying the inquiry panel would be dissolved and a new statutory 
inquiry would be created.4 Mrs May explained that she wanted the inquiry to 
have the power to compel witnesses to give evidence, and that there were 
three ways to do this:  
 
First, by establishing a royal commission; secondly, by converting the 
current inquiry into a statutory inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005, 
subject to consultation with the chairman once appointed; or, thirdly, 
by setting up a new statutory inquiry under the 2005 Act.5 
 
Mrs May concluded that: 
 
[A] royal commission would not have the same robustness in law as a 
statutory inquiry. In particular, it would not have the same clarity over 
its powers to compel witnesses to give evidence. I have decided not to 
convert the current inquiry, because doing so would not address the 
concerns of survivors about the degree of transparency in the original 
appointments process. I have therefore decided upon the third option 
of establishing a new statutory inquiry with a panel.6 
 
  
                                            
1
 HC Hansard, 7 July 2014, cols 23–45. 
2
 ibid, col 25. 
3
 ibid. 
4
 HC Hansard, 4 February 2015, cols 277.  
5
 ibid, col 276. 
6
 ibid, cols 276–7. 
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The current chair of the IICSA is Professor Alexis Jay OBE, a visiting 
professor at Strathclyde University, where she chairs the Centre for 
Excellence for Looked After Children in Scotland.7 Professor Jay was 
appointed in August 20168, following the resignation of the IICSA’s previous 
chair Dame Lowell Goddard.9 Prior to her appointment as chair, Professor 
Jay had been a member of the inquiry panel. 
 
Terms of Reference and Purpose 
 
The terms of reference for the IICSA state that its purpose is: 
 
To consider the extent to which state and non-state institutions have 
failed in their duty of care to protect children from sexual abuse and 
exploitation; to consider the extent to which those failings have since 
been addressed; to identify further action needed to address any 
failings identified; to consider the steps which it is necessary for state 
and non-state institutions to take in order to protect children from 
such abuse in future; and to publish a report with recommendations.10 
 
The IICSA’s principles, as defined within its terms of reference, state that the 
inquiry’s function is not to determine civil or criminal liability of named 
individuals or organisations, but it would refer any allegations of child abuse 
it received to the police. Its terms of reference state: 
 
• The inquiry will have full access to all the material it seeks. 
• Any allegation of child abuse received by the inquiry will be 
referred to the police; 
• All personal and sensitive information will be appropriately 
protected; and will be made available only to those who need to 
see it; and 
• It is not part of the inquiry’s function to determine civil or 
criminal liability of named individuals or organisations. This 
should not, however, inhibit the Inquiry from reaching findings of 
fact relevant to its terms of reference. 
 
Section 2(1) of the Inquiries Act 2005 provides that “an inquiry panel is not 
to rule on, and has no power to determine, any person’s civil or criminal 
liability”. Section 2(2) provides that “an inquiry panel is not to be inhibited in 
the discharge of its functions by any likelihood of liability being inferred from 
                                            
7
 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, ‘Professor Alexis Jay OBE’, accessed 
7 December 2018. 
8
 ibid. 
9
 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, ‘Statement from Hon. Dame Lowell 
Goddard’, 5 August 2016. 
10
 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, ‘Terms of Reference’, accessed 7 December 
2018. 
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facts that it determines or recommendations that it makes”. The provisions 
of the Inquiries Act 2005 and the Inquiry Rules 2006 are discussed in 
section 2.1 of this briefing. 
 
The IICSA’s terms of reference outline the methods by which it would go 
about its work. This included that the inquiry would: 
 
• Consider all the information which is available from the various 
published and unpublished reviews, court cases, and 
investigations which have so far concluded; 
• Consider the experience of survivors of child sexual abuse; 
providing opportunities for them to bear witness to the inquiry, 
having regard to the need to provide appropriate support in 
doing so; 
• Consider whether state and non-state institutions failed to 
identify such abuse and/or whether there was otherwise an 
inappropriate institutional response to allegations of child sexual 
abuse and/or whether there were ineffective child protection 
procedures in place; 
• Disclose, where appropriate and in line with security and data 
protection protocols, any documents which were considered as 
part of the inquiry; 
• Conduct the work of the inquiry in [as] transparent a manner as 
possible, consistent with the effective investigation of the matters 
falling within the terms of reference, and having regard to all the 
relevant duties of confidentiality.11 
 
The terms of reference give examples of state and non-state institutions, 
including: 
 
• Government departments, the Cabinet Office, Parliament and 
ministers; 
• Police, prosecuting authorities, schools including private and 
state-funded boarding and day schools, specialist education (such 
as music tuition), local authorities (including care homes and 
children’s services), health services, and prisons/secure estates; 
• Churches and other religious denominations and organisations; 
• Political parties; and 
• The armed services.12 
 
The IICSA extends to England and Wales, but should it identify material 
related to the devolved administrations it would pass this to the relevant 
                                            
11
 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, ‘Terms of Reference’, accessed 7 December 
2018. 
12
 ibid. 
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authorities. The full terms of reference of the IICSA are reproduced in 
appendix I of this briefing.  
 
Structure 
 
The IICSA consists of its chair, Professor Alexis Jay OBE, and a panel of 
three members, Professor Sir Malcom Evans KCMG OBE, Ivor Frank and 
Drusilla Sharpling CBE.13 It also has a legal team with Brian Altman QC as its 
counsel and Martin Smith as its solicitor. The IICSA has established a victims’ 
and survivors’ consultative panel, consisting of eight members, which assists 
and advises the inquiry. A victims’ and survivors’ forum allows for any victim 
or survivor to register to join the forum and receive updates on the work of 
the inquiry. The IICSA will arrange for the forum to hold open public 
meetings four times a year.14 
 
The IICSA is divided into three core projects, the truth project, the research 
project and the public hearings project:15  
 
• The truth project is a means by which individuals can 
communicate their experiences to the inquiry; for example in a 
private session with a facilitator in person, by phone, or in 
writing.16 The IICSA explains that accounts are not “tested, 
challenged, or contradicted” and that the information supplied is 
anonymised and considered by the chair and panel members 
when reaching their conclusions and making recommendations.17 
• The research project works across the inquiry’s 13 
investigation strands. The project aims to collate “what is already 
known about child sexual abuse and finds out the gaps in our 
knowledge”.18 Through the project the IICSA carries out new 
research, including analysing information received through the 
truth project. Additionally, the research project “quality assures 
internal inquiry data so that its use can be defended”.19 
• The IICSA’s public hearings project “resembles a 
conventional public inquiry, where witnesses give evidence on 
oath and are subject to cross examination”.20 The IICSA has said 
                                            
13
 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, ‘Who We Are’, accessed 7 December 
2018. 
14
 ibid. 
15
 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, ‘How We Work’, accessed 7 December 
2018. 
16
 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse Truth Project, ‘What’s Involved’, accessed 
7 December 2018. 
17
 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, ‘How We Work’, accessed 7 December 
2018. 
18
 ibid. 
19
 ibid. 
20
 ibid. 
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the hearings would last for approximately six weeks and would 
relate to “case studies [selected by the inquiry] from a range 
of institutions that appear to illustrate a pattern of institutional 
failings”. The IICSA has explained that: 
 
A hearing may relate to a particular individual who appears 
to have been enabled to sexually abuse children in 
institutional settings. Or it may relate to an institution that 
appears to have demonstrated repeated failings over a 
number of years. Evidence is likely to be taken from both 
representatives of the institutions under investigation, and 
from victims and survivors of sexual abuse.21  
 
Whilst the inquiry has stated that it does not have the power to convict or 
to award compensation, “it will use its fact-finding powers fully to make 
findings against named individuals or institutions where the evidence justifies 
it”.22 The IICSA selected its 13 investigations on the basis of the panel’s 
selection criteria.23 It has said that the investigations would fall into two 
categories: 
 
(a)  Institution specific, involving inquiries into 
particular institutions or type of institution; 
(b)  Thematic, concerning a series of broad areas where multiple 
institutions may play a role in protecting children from abuse.24 
 
In selecting situations suitable for investigation, the panel will apply the 
following criteria:  
 
(a)  The situation appears to the panel to involve credible allegations 
of child sexual abuse in an institutional setting, or by a person 
who has exploited an official position in order to perpetrate child 
sexual abuse;  
(b)  Institution(s) appears to the panel, on credible evidence to have 
facilitated or failed to prevent child sexual abuse, whether 
through an act, policy or omission; or  
(c)  Institution(s) or a person acting in an official capacity, appears to 
have failed to respond appropriately to allegations of child sexual 
abuse.25 
 
                                            
21
 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, ‘How We Work’, accessed 7 December 
2018. 
22
 ibid. 
23
 The 13 investigations are listed in appendix II of this briefing, as at 10 December 2018. 
24
 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, ‘Criteria for Selection of Investigations’, 
accessed 7 December 2018. 
25
 ibid. 
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The panel will select situations which: 
 
(a)  Appear to it to be typical of a pattern of child sexual abuse 
occurring in the sector or context involved;  
(b)  Appear to be practically capable of detailed examination through 
oral and written evidence;  
(c)  Appear to involve no significant risk to the fairness and 
effectiveness of any ongoing police investigation or prosecution;  
(d)  Appear likely to result in currently relevant conclusions and/or 
recommendations. The panel will also have regard to the need to 
ensure that the selection of situations for examination takes 
account of the needs of particularly vulnerable children and those 
from socially excluded or minority groups.26 
 
2. Statutory Inquiries 
 
2.1 Inquiries Act 2005 and Inquiry Rules 2006 
 
The IICSA was established as a statutory inquiry under the Inquiries Act 
2005 (the 2005 Act). The 2005 Act makes statutory provisions under which 
an inquiry may be established and managed.27 Amongst these provisions, the 
2005 Act sets out requirements for the constitution of the inquiry, how 
proceedings should be administered and the submission and publication of 
the inquiry’s reports. This section of this briefing gives an overview of those 
provisions which relate primarily to the provision or acquisition of evidence 
by an inquiry under the 2005 Act.28 
 
Inquiries may be established under the 2005 Act in relation to a case where 
it appears to a minister that: 
 
(a)     particular events have caused, or are capable of causing, public 
concern, or 
(b)     there is public concern that particular events may have 
occurred.29 
 
Section 2(1) of the Inquiries Act 2005 provides that “an inquiry panel is not 
to rule on, and has no power to determine, any person’s civil or criminal 
                                            
26
 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, ‘Criteria for Selection of Investigations’, 
accessed 7 December 2018. 
27
 Inquiries may be established through other means, for example Royal Commissions. 
Further details can be found in: House of Commons Library, Public Inquiries: Non-Statutory 
Commissions of Inquiry, 1 June 2016. 
28
 The House of Commons Library has published a briefing covering the Inquiries Act 2005 
more generally, issues arising from the holding of statutory public inquiries, and notes on 
statutory inquiries that are currently open; see: House of Commons Library, The Inquiries 
Act 2005, 30 January 2018. 
29
 Inquiries Act 2005, s 1(1). 
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liability”. Section 2(2) provides the qualification that “an inquiry panel is not 
to be inhibited in the discharge of its functions by any likelihood of liability 
being inferred from facts that it determines or recommendations that it 
makes”.  
 
Regarding powers to take evidence and procedure, section 17 of the 2005 
Act states that: 
 
(1)     Subject to any provision of this act or of rules under section 41, 
the procedure and conduct of an inquiry are to be such as the 
chairman of the inquiry may direct. 
(2)     In particular, the chairman may take evidence on oath, and for 
that purpose may administer oaths. 
(3)     In making any decision as to the procedure or conduct of an 
inquiry, the chairman must act with fairness and with regard also 
to the need to avoid any unnecessary cost (whether to public 
funds or to witnesses or others).  
 
Section 19 provides for restrictions to be imposed on attendance at an 
inquiry or disclosures or publication of any evidence or documents given, 
produced or provided to the inquiry. Such restrictions may be given in either 
or both of the following ways: 
 
(a)     by being specified in a notice (a “restriction notice”) given by the 
minister to the chairman at any time before the end of the 
inquiry; 
(b)     by being specified in an order (a “restriction order”) made by 
the chairman during the course of the inquiry.30 
 
These can only specify restrictions that are required by a statutory 
provision, enforceable EU obligation or rule of law, or as the minister or 
chair: 
 
[C]onsiders to be conducive to the inquiry fulfilling its terms of 
reference or to be necessary in the public interest, having regard in 
particular to the matters mentioned in subsection (4).31 
 
Subsection (4) includes considerations such as the extent to which any 
restriction on attendance, disclosure or publication might inhibit the allaying 
of public concern. 
 
Under section 21(1) of the 2005 Act, the chair may by notice require a 
person to attend the inquiry to give evidence or produce relevant 
documents within their possession: 
                                            
30
 Inquiries Act 2005, s 19(2). 
31
 ibid, s 19(3)(b). 
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(1) The chairman of an inquiry may by notice require a person to 
attend at a time and place stated in the notice: 
(a) to give evidence; 
(b) to produce any documents in his custody or under his 
control that relate to a matter in question at the inquiry; 
(c) to produce any other thing in his custody or under his 
control for inspection, examination or testing by or on 
behalf of the inquiry panel.  
 
Section 21(2) provides similar powers without requiring attendance at the 
inquiry, for example through the provision of a written statement. 
Subsection (3) provides that notices under subsections (1) or (2) must 
explain the consequences of non-compliance and tell the recipient what they 
should do if they wished to claim an inability to comply, or argue it was not 
reasonable “in all the circumstances” to require them to do so, the latter 
being provided for under subsection (4). Subsection (5) provides that the 
chair must consider the public interest in the information that the notice 
sought to obtain for the inquiry, also having regard to its likely importance.32 
 
Section 22 provides that a person can only be required to provide 
information under section 21 if they could be required to so if the 
proceedings of the inquiry were civil proceedings: 
 
(1) A person may not under section 21 be required to give, produce 
or provide any evidence or document if: 
(a) he could not be required to do so if the proceedings of the 
inquiry were civil proceedings in a court in the relevant 
part of the United Kingdom, or 
(b) the requirement would be incompatible with an EU 
obligation 
(2) The rules of law under which evidence or documents are 
permitted or required to be withheld on grounds of public 
interest immunity apply in relation to an inquiry as they apply in 
relation to civil proceedings in a court in the relevant part of the 
United Kingdom. 
 
Inquiry Rules 2006 
 
The Inquiry Rules 2006 (the Rules) supplement the 2005 Act’s provisions. 
The Rules are made under section 41 of the 2005 Act and “act as a statutory 
guide for the chairman and provide assistance in managing and conducting 
the proceedings” of an inquiry and consist of 34 rules.33 The Rules “set out 
procedures for applying for publicly funded legal representation, requiring 
                                            
32
 Powers under section 21.  
33
 Explanatory Memorandum to the Inquiry Rules, para 2.1. 
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rates and the extent of work to be agreed in advance”.34 The Rules also set 
out requirements for recognising ‘core participants’, legal representatives 
and the procedures governing the provision of both written and oral 
evidence. The explanatory memorandum to the rules states that they “assist 
the chairman in controlling oral proceedings and prevent extensive and 
costly cross-examination procedures”.35 For example rule 10 states that: 
 
(1)     Subject to paragraphs (2) to (5), where a witness is giving oral 
evidence at an inquiry hearing, only counsel to the inquiry (or, if 
counsel has not been appointed, the solicitor to the inquiry) and the 
inquiry panel may ask questions of that witness. 
 
Paragraphs (2) to (5) of rule 10 provide particular discretion to the chair on 
this: 
 
(2) Where a witness, whether a core participant or otherwise, has 
been questioned orally in the course of an inquiry hearing pursuant to 
paragraph (1), the chairman may direct that the recognised legal 
representative of that witness may ask the witness questions. 
(3) Where— 
(a) a witness other than a core participant has been 
questioned orally in the course of an inquiry hearing by 
counsel to the inquiry, or by the inquiry panel; and 
(b) that witness’s evidence directly relates to the evidence of 
another witness, 
the recognised legal representative of the witness to whom the 
evidence relates may apply to the chairman for permission to question 
the witness who has given oral evidence. 
(4) The recognised legal representative of a core participant may 
apply to the chairman for permission to ask questions of a witness 
giving oral evidence. 
(5) When making an application under paragraphs (3) or (4), the 
recognised legal representative must state— 
(a) the issues in respect of which a witness is to be 
questioned; and 
(b) whether the questioning will raise new issues or, if not, 
why the questioning should be permitted. 
 
Rules 13 to 16 concern the issuing of ‘warning letters’. Such letters may be 
sent by the chair to any person: 
 
(a) he considers may be, or who has been, subject to criticism in the 
inquiry proceedings; or 
  
                                            
34
 Explanatory Memorandum to the Inquiry Rules, para 2.1. 
35
 ibid. 
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(b) about whom criticism may be inferred from evidence that has 
been given during the inquiry proceedings; or 
(c) who may be subject to criticism in the report, or any interim 
report.36 
 
Core participants are persons given special status under the Rules. The chair 
may so designate someone at any time during the course of the inquiry, 
providing they consent. Rule 5 sets out provisions for the designation of 
individuals as core participants; for example, the chair must consider 
whether “the person played, or may have played, a direct and significant role 
in relation to the matters to which the inquiry relates”. Core participants 
may have access to particular treatment by the inquiry, on consideration of 
the chair. The House of Lords Inquiries Act 2005 Committee explained that: 
 
The main advantages of core participant status often derive from 
decisions of the chairman on practice and procedure. Thus Lord 
Justice Leveson allowed core participants to see in advance, under 
strict rules of confidentiality, copies of statements that witnesses had 
provided and which would form the basis of their evidence. For those 
who were not core participants, the witness statements only became 
available when published on the inquiry website after the conclusion of 
the evidence of the witness.37 
 
2.2 House of Lords Inquiries Act 2005 Committee: Post-Legislative 
Scrutiny  
 
On 11 March 2014, the House of Lords Inquiries Act 2005 Committee 
published its post-legislative scrutiny report.38 In its report, the committee 
argued that inquiries into matters of major public concern were now “an 
integral feature of the governance of this country”.39  
 
Overall the committee did not hear “any suggestion that the [2005] Act as a 
whole requires radical surgery”.40 However, the committee made a total of 
33 recommendations which covered the breadth of the 2005 Act. This 
section of the briefing focuses on those conclusions and recommendations 
related to the handling of evidence by inquiries under the act. 
 
  
                                            
36
 Inquiry Rules 2006, rule 13. 
37
 House of Lords Inquiries Act 2005 Committee, The Inquiries Act 2005: Post-Legislative 
Scrutiny, 11 March 2014, HL Paper 143 of session 2013–14, p 70. 
38
 ibid. 
39
 ibid, p 6. 
40
 ibid, p 86. 
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Inquisitorial Model 
 
The committee examined the issue of whether inquiries should be 
inquisitorial or adversarial. The committee argued that nothing “should 
prevent an inquiry from seeking evidence which will allow it to perform its 
central task of eliciting the truth”.41 The committee drew a distinction 
between what it described as the adversarial system used in court 
procedures and the inquisitorial nature of an inquiry, arguing that the truth 
was a by-product of the court system: 
 
Rule 1.4 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 imposes on the civil courts 
of England and Wales a duty of active case management. Nevertheless 
litigation, whether civil or criminal, is basically adversarial, in the sense 
that evidence is presented by the parties in furtherance of their case 
rather than requested by the court. Witnesses are examined and 
cross-examined to the same end. Court procedure is designed with 
this in mind. The truth, if it emerges, does so as a by-product of the 
adversarial litigation.42 
 
The committee referred to the provisions in section 2 of the Inquiries Act 
2005—that an inquiry’s role was not to rule on or determine any person’s 
civil or criminal liability and that it should not be inhibited in the discharge of 
its functions by any likelihood of liability being inferred from the facts that it 
determines or recommendations that it makes.43 In its report, the 
committee quoted the views of Jason Beer QC, a witness before the 
committee,44 who argued that an inquisitorial model: 
 
Allows the inquiry to remain focused on its terms of reference […] It 
allows the inquiry to focus on the issues that are of concern to it, to 
the chairman or the panel members, because an inquisitorial model has 
the inquisitor at its centre. Lastly, it allows often contentious and 
difficult issues to be examined and determined in a relatively 
dispassionate environment, without the extra heat that is brought to 
an affair when people are adversaries to each other.45 
 
The committee concluded that it agreed that the inquisitorial procedure was 
preferable in an inquiry and that the 2005 Act provided for this: 
 
We agree with our witnesses that an inquisitorial procedure for 
inquiries is greatly to be preferred to an adversarial procedure, and we 
                                            
41
 House of Lords Inquiries Act 2005 Committee, The Inquiries Act 2005: Post-Legislative 
Scrutiny, 11 March 2014, HL Paper 143 of session 2013–14, p 66. 
42
 ibid. 
43
 ibid. 
44
 Jason Beer is also the editor of Public Inquiries, 2011. 
45
 House of Lords Inquiries Act 2005 Committee, The Inquiries Act 2005: Post-Legislative 
Scrutiny, 11 March 2014, HL Paper 143 of session 2013–14, p 66. 
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conclude that the Act provides the right procedural framework for 
both the chairman and counsel to the inquiry to conduct an inquiry 
efficiently, effectively and above all fairly.46 
 
Salmon Principles: Cross-Examination 
 
The committee also considered the six ‘Salmon principles’; these were 
principles established by the 1966 Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry, 
chaired by Lord Justice Salmon.47 The commission had “its origins” in the 
inquiry into the Profumo affair.48 The principles related to the treatment of 
those people taking part in inquiries, and were: 
 
(1) Before any person becomes involved in an inquiry, the tribunal 
must be satisfied that there are circumstances which affect him 
and which the tribunal proposes to investigate.  
(2) Before any person who is involved in an inquiry is called as a 
witness, he should be informed of any allegations which are made 
against him and the substance of the evidence in support of 
them.  
(3) (a) He should be given an adequate opportunity of preparing his 
case and of being assisted by his legal advisers. (b) His legal 
expenses should normally be met out of public funds.  
(4) He should have the opportunity of being examined by his own 
solicitor or counsel and of stating his case in public at the inquiry.  
(5) Any material witness he wishes called at the inquiry should, if 
reasonably practicable, be heard.  
(6) He should have the opportunity of testing by cross-examination 
conducted by his own solicitor or counsel any evidence which 
may affect him.49 
 
The committee explained that the Salmon principles were considered by 
Lord Justice Scott50 in the inquiry into exports of defence equipment to Iraq, 
which reported in 1996.51 The committee quoted Lord Scott as arguing that 
the principles “carry strong overtones of ordinary adversarial litigation” and  
  
                                            
46
 House of Lords Inquiries Act 2005 Committee, The Inquiries Act 2005: Post-Legislative 
Scrutiny, 11 March 2014, HL Paper 143 of session 2013–14, p 93. 
47
 Subsequently Lord Salmon. 
48
 House of Lords Inquiries Act 2005 Committee, The Inquiries Act 2005: Post-Legislative 
Scrutiny, 11 March 2014, HL Paper 14 of session 2013–14, p 14. 
49
 ibid, p 15. 
50
 Subsequently Lord Scott of Foscote. 
51
 National Archives, ‘Catalogue Description: Records of the Inquiry into Exports of 
Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions (Scott Inquiry)’, 
accessed 10 December 2018. 
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as expressing concern that these could impact an inquiry’s inquisitorial 
nature: 
 
In summary, in my opinion, care should be taken lest by an 
indiscriminate adoption and application of the six ‘cardinal principles’ 
the inquiry’s inquisitorial procedures become hampered by an 
unnecessary involvement of adversarial techniques and of lawyers 
acting for witnesses and others whose interests may lie in delay and 
obfuscation.52 
 
The committee discussed the Salmon principles in relation to legal 
representation for core participants and witnesses under the Inquiries Act 
2005. It argued inquiries since had become increasingly inquisitorial, and less 
reliant on the Salmon principles.53 The committee stated that it had 
considered whether the provisions of the 2005 Act and the Rules struck the 
right balance between the interests of the inquiry as a whole, and the fair 
treatment of core participants and witnesses. The committee said that it was 
“conscious of the fact that, although the inquiry will not be determining civil 
or criminal liability, liability may be inferred from what is said, and 
reputations may be damaged or even destroyed”.54 However, the committee 
said it believed the first two Salmon principles had been dispensed with by 
rule 10 of the Rules: 
 
The default position is now that only counsel to the inquiry and the 
inquiry panel can ask questions of a witness to an inquiry. There are 
qualifications to this. The chairman can direct that a witness who has 
been questioned by counsel to the inquiry can be questioned by his 
own legal representative. The chairman can allow a witness to be 
questioned by the legal representative of a core participant; and, within 
strictly defined criteria, he can allow the legal representative of a 
witness who is not a core participant to question another witness. But 
in both cases an application has to be made to the chairman, and it is 
the chairman’s decision which is final.55 
 
Consequently, the committee argued that the right of a witness to be 
examined by their own counsel, and to have their counsel cross-examine 
other witnesses, had “already gone”.56 The committee believed that this 
created a heavy burden on the chair, and if appropriate the chair’s counsel, 
to “make sure that the right questions get asked, and that no important 
issues are overlooked because questions go unasked”.57 
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The committee’s report said that one of its members felt that witnesses 
should have the right to be represented by their own counsel. However, the 
majority of the committee—whilst sympathising with this view—believed 
that with the right chair and counsel, core participants and witnesses would 
be “sufficiently protected by the flexibility of the procedure under the 
Inquiry Rules [2006]”.58 It concluded that: 
 
The fourth and sixth Salmon principles, which allow a person the 
opportunity of being examined by his own solicitor or counsel, and of 
testing by cross-examination any evidence which may affect him, are 
over-prescriptive and have the effect of imposing an adversarial 
procedure on proceedings which should be inquisitorial. They should 
no longer be followed. Reliance should be placed on the chairman who 
has a duty to ensure that the inquiry is conducted fairly.59 
 
Subsequent Use of Evidence 
 
Whilst the role of an inquiry is not to determine civil or criminal liability, the 
committee examined how much weight evidence given to an inquiry should 
have in any subsequent proceedings. The committee believed it inevitable 
that evidence given to an inquiry could be relevant to such proceedings. The 
committee referred to evidence it received on this point: 
 
Lord Cullen of Whitekirk said: “It is inevitable that what turns up in 
the inquiry will be material that could lead to the founding of a claim,” 
and Lord Gill agreed: “Certainly some of the findings that I made in my 
inquiries were plainly significant in relation to the civil claims. I 
understand that in some of the civil claims that are still going through 
the court, claimants are referring to some of my findings. That is 
inevitable. I do not see that that can be avoided.” Nor is it necessarily 
a bad thing, for as Dr Mackie said, “it does seem a terrible waste to 
run through a whole inquiry process and to then contemplate starting 
from the outset again with litigation or civil liability proceedings.” Sir 
Stephen Sedley thought that “Lord Justice Taylor’s findings at the first 
Hillsborough Inquiry could very well have stood as prima facie 
evidence of liability in the litigation that followed.”60 
 
However, the committee also referred to evidence given to it by law firm 
Herbert Smith Freehills61 which argued that the testing of evidence before an 
inquiry may be more limited than in civil proceedings and that in 
consequence the inquiry was not in the same position as a court as regards 
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fact finding. Herbert Smith Freehills argued that “this can be unfair and 
unnecessarily damaging to participants, particularly where allegations of 
wrongdoing/misconduct are asserted”.62  
 
The committee said that it believed that it was right that evidence given to 
an inquiry, and findings based upon it, could be used as evidence in 
subsequent proceedings.63 
 
Appointment of Legal Counsel 
 
The committee also considered the appointment of legal counsel by the 
inquiry chair, agreeing “with the majority of [its] witnesses that for an 
inquiry of any length the appointment of counsel to the inquiry is essential”.64 
It also recommended that: 
 
A provision should be added to the [2005] Act stating that the 
chairman, and only the chairman, may appoint one or more barristers 
or advocates in private practice to act as counsel to the inquiry.65 
 
Assistance to Witnesses and Core Participants 
 
The committee concluded that the inquiry chair and counsel to the inquiry 
should meet those affected by the inquiry as a matter of course and there 
should be a dedicated team or named members of staff responsible for 
liaising with witnesses. It also argued that an inquiry’s secretariat should 
ensure that witness and core participants “are handled sensitively, so that 
victims and families do not come into contact with those they believe to be 
responsible for any harm”. 66 
 
Warning Letters 
 
The committee expressed concern about rules 13–15 of the Rules 2006 
which relate to warning letters sent to those who will or may be criticised in 
the inquiry’s interim or final report. The committee heard evidence from a 
number of former chairs of inquiries that the process of issuing warning 
letters, and of those criticised responding to them (a process sometimes 
referred to as Maxwellisation) could add to the length and cost of an 
inquiry.67 The committee felt that fixed rules regarding the use of these 
warning letters were unhelpful and “the provisions of the Rules on warning 
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letters are highly detailed and go far beyond what is necessary”.68 The 
committee recommended that rules 13–15 of the Rules should be revoked; 
the report provided suggested wording for a single new rule. 
 
Government Response 
 
The Government responded to the committee’s report in June 2014.69 It 
rejected the committee’s recommendation 24, that the fourth and sixth 
Salmon principles be dropped because it argued, like the committee, that 
rule 10 of the Rules already effectively excluded them: 
 
This Rule sets out the limited scope for allowing a person involved 
with an inquiry the opportunity to be asked questions by his or her 
own legal representative, and to test by cross-examination evidence 
which may affect that person. Rule 10 also provides the chair with 
wide discretion to ensure that an inquiry is conducted fairly.70 
 
The Government also disagreed with recommendation 23, that the 2005 Act 
should be amended such that the chair, and only the chair may appoint 
counsel to the inquiry. The Government stated that: 
 
The Government rejects this recommendation because ministers will 
want to retain control of such issues which affect departmental 
budgets and the terms of reference of an inquiry.71 
 
The House of Lords debated the committee’s report on 19 March 2015.72 In 
July 2015, the Government wrote to the chair of the House of Lords Liaison 
Committee, as part of the committee’s review of the work of the Inquiries 
Act 2005 Committee.73 The Government stated that in light of arguments 
advanced in the debate on 19 March 2015 it accepted that the process of 
Maxwellisation and its related rules “should be reconsidered to see whether 
greater clarity can be given to both chairmen and those that may be 
criticised in inquiry reports”. The letter further stated that: 
 
Rules 13 to 15 will therefore be revived as we take forward work to 
amend the Inquiry Rules 2006 which Lord Shutt’s committee 
recommended. The changes to the Rules are in hand and other   
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recommendations that require primary legislation will be made when a 
suitable legislative vehicle becomes available.74 
 
The committee had also asked the Government to respond to its conclusion 
that inquiry findings, based on evidence, should be available for use in 
subsequent proceedings. The Government stated that: 
 
This was not one of the committee’s recommendations and 
consequently not a point on which we consulted. We would be happy 
to look into this proposal but [we hope the committee] understands 
that we would need to work through the detail before coming to a 
position.75 
 
Lord Shutt of Greetland asked an oral question on 28 June 2018 about what 
plans the Government had to look again at the committee’s 
recommendations. Baroness Vere of Norbiton, a Government Whip, 
responded saying that: 
 
The Government agree with the Select Committee’s conclusions in its 
report published in March 2014 that the Inquiries Act 2005 and Inquiry 
Rules 2006 are fundamentally sound, providing a robust and effective 
framework for the conduct of public inquiries, but that some 
worthwhile improvements can be made.76 
 
At the time of writing such changes had not been made to the legislation. 
 
3. Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse: Remit and 
Arrangements for Handling of Evidence 
  
In the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse’s opening statement as a 
statutory inquiry under the 2005 Act, the then chair, Dame Lowell Goddard, 
expressed a commitment to objectivity in the approach of the inquiry to its 
work: 
 
An inquiry on this scale requires a focused approach, with defined 
objectives from the outset, and a working structure that is clear and 
practical. It also requires complete objectivity. That implies a 
commitment to hear all sides with an open mind, without any pre-
judgment about the issues, and under conditions which provide a fair 
opportunity for all of those affected by the Inquiry to share their 
experiences and put their points across.77 
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The opening statement set out the structure and working methods that the 
panel had then decided to adopt. For example, it set out the inquiry’s 
approach to core participants (paras 46–56) and stated that the chair’s 
provisional view was that: 
 
Core participant status should be available to individuals, groups of 
individuals, and entities who meet the criteria laid down in the rules 
(that is, they have a significant role or interest in the inquiry, or are 
liable to be criticised). Each application will be given individual 
consideration but core participant status is likely to be granted to 
individual victims or survivors (particularly those who intend to 
testify); individuals and organisations that are potentially open to 
criticism; and to any other individual, organisation or entity that can 
demonstrate that it meets the criteria in Rule 5 of the 2006 Rules 
(whether in relation to the first part of the modular inquiry or the 
second).78 
 
The opening statement described the public hearings project as the element 
of the inquiry that would most resemble that of a public inquiry.79 In regard 
to institutions asked to participate in these investigations, the chair stated 
that: 
 
Institutions whose actions are called into question will be required to 
provide all relevant documentary evidence to the inquiry well in 
advance, to answer questions and to nominate individual 
representatives to attend to give evidence in person. Where it proves 
necessary to do so, [the chair] will not hesitate to issue orders under 
section 21 of the 2005 Act compelling the production of evidence and 
the attendance of witnesses.80 
 
The then chair also expressed the intention “at the appropriate time” to put 
out a general call for evidence. 81 This would be for evidence from individuals 
or organisations with relevant evidence to give, or with submissions to 
make, in relation to the wider context and the lessons to be learned. It 
would not just be from those individuals and institutions immediately 
involved in the situation under investigation. 
 
The opening statement said that the chair did not intend to use its powers 
under the 2005 Act to compel victims and survivors to give evidence of their 
experiences: 
 
While it would obviously be of assistance to the inquiry to hear as 
much direct oral evidence from victims and survivors as possible, they 
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must never be made to carry the weight of proving anything. The focus 
of attention must remain firmly on scrutinising the institutions 
concerned and their handling of cases of child sexual abuse.82 
 
The inquiry also stated that core participants would be given the opportunity 
to make closing statements and file closing written submissions. It would also 
issue warning letters and publish reports as soon as possible: 
 
The inquiry panel will consider the evidence and submissions and reach 
findings of fact on the appropriate (flexible) standard of proof. Where 
appropriate, the inquiry panel will issue warning letters to those liable 
to be criticised. The inquiry will publish reports on each modular 
inquiry as soon as possible after it is completed, reflecting its 
conclusions about the individual case, the wider context and the 
lessons learned. All reports will be approved by the full inquiry panel 
before publication and will reflect the assessment of the Inquiry as a 
whole.83 
 
On 3 April 2016, the then chair, Dame Lowell Goddard, issued a statement 
about how the inquiry was conducting its work. The statement said that this 
was in response to what she described as “recent media reporting 
inaccuracies”.84 The chair expressed a concern that this had suggested that 
the inquiry’s worked related primarily to individuals. However, “in fact, the 
significant majority of the inquiry’s work does not relate to individuals of 
public prominence”.85 The chair’s statement referred to four of its 
investigations that had held preliminary hearings at the time and stated that 
any investigation of the conduct of individuals was to assist in its examination 
of institutional failures: 
 
Each of these investigations, as well as the other nine, is focused on the 
extent to which a range of institutions have failed, or have continued 
to fail, to protect children from sexual abuse or failed to respond 
adequately to reports of abuse. Inevitably, that focus requires an 
examination of the conduct of individuals to determine the extent of 
any institutional failures.86 
 
The chair said that she would ensure that the IICSA examined all issues fairly 
and impartially and that the inquiry would “consider all relevant evidence, 
take testimony from witnesses and publish a report for each investigation 
which sets out in clear terms what the evidence shows”.87 She referred also 
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to “those who have claimed this week that the inquiry will only consider the 
perspectives of victims and survivors, and exclude those of others affected 
by allegations of child sexual abuse”, stating that this view was wrong.88 She 
stated that the inquiry would recognise the damage that could be caused by 
false accusations of sexual abuse: 
 
Counsel to the inquiry, Ben Emmerson QC,89 noted at the inquiry’s 
first preliminary hearing that the inquiry will need to remain sensitive 
to the particular needs of vulnerable complainants without unduly 
privileging their testimony. At the same time, he said the inquiry will 
need to recognise the damage that can be caused by false accusations 
of sexual abuse, without hesitating to make findings against individuals 
and institutions if justified by the evidence. I agree with that analysis. I 
am committed to ensuring that we hear all relevant testimony, 
including from victims and survivors as well as from those affected by 
false allegations of abuse. As I announced in November last year, the 
Inquiry intends to explore the balance which must be struck between 
encouraging the reporting of child sexual abuse and protecting the 
rights of the accused.90   
 
Regarding the questioning of witnesses, the then chair stated that this would 
normally be done by inquiry’s counsel, but that she would consider 
applications to ask direct questions: 
 
I will ensure that all relevant evidence is considered. As is standard 
practice in public inquiries, questions to witnesses will normally be 
asked by counsel to the inquiry whose role will include, where 
necessary, the exploration of witness credibility. Affected parties will 
not ordinarily be permitted to ask questions of witnesses directly, but 
as I said in my opening statement in July 2015, affected parties are 
entitled to make an application to ask direct questions and I will grant 
those applications if fairness requires it.91  
 
Dame Lowell Goddard resigned as chair on 5 August 2016.92 Her successor, 
Professor Alexis Jay, published an internal review of the IICSA in December 
2016.93 Professor Jay expressed concern that whilst the inquiry had made 
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progress it had also struggled, and had not consistently undertaken its work 
in a “timely, inclusive and transparent way”.94 The purpose of the internal 
review was to set a clear direction for the inquiry. It did not alter the 
inquiry’s terms of reference.95 The review came to eight conclusions: 
 
1. That the strategic approach of the inquiry, delivering through 
three major strands of work—public hearings, research and 
analysis, and the truth project—is right but that their 
implementation of this approach has been too slow.  
2. That the inquiry has done valuable work to date in a number of 
areas but must demonstrate this more clearly.  
3. That the inquiry needs rebalancing to ensure sufficient attention 
is paid to making recommendations for the future.  
4. That the inquiry’s commitment to exposing past failures of 
institutions to protect children from sexual abuse should remain 
unchanged.  
5. That the inquiry needs to publish a regular timetable of its 
activity starting with 2017/18.  
6. That the governance of the inquiry needs revising to provide 
stronger accountability and oversight of the programme of work.  
7. That those with an interest in the inquiry’s work should have 
more opportunity to engage with it. 
8. That the inquiry’s relationship with victims, survivors and others 
should be kept under constant review.96 
 
The internal review also provided updates on several of its investigations.97 
The most up to date status of the IICSA’s investigations can be found on its 
website.98 
 
The internal review also stated that the IICSA would publish an interim 
report.99 This was published in April 2018.100 The report reiterated Professor 
Jay’s expectation that the inquiry will have made “substantial progress” by 
2020.101 On the issue of providing evidence to the inquiry, the report stated 
that the inquiry understood that this process could be challenging for  
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participants and it was therefore providing support to witnesses and core 
participants: 
 
Providing evidence at a public hearing can be a daunting and demanding 
experience, whether or not it is done anonymously. For this reason, 
the Inquiry ensures that emotional support is available to witnesses 
and core participants both before and after they give evidence. So far, 
the inquiry has provided support to 96 witnesses and core participants 
(excluding support that has been provided during public hearings).102 
 
Core participants are those designated by the chair as people they consider 
to have a particular interest in the issues under investigation. Core 
participants usually see documents before they are used in a hearing and 
“can suggest lines of enquiry”.103 They can also apply to the inquiry for 
funding to cover legal and other costs. The inquiry has published its protocol 
for considering applications for core participant status and frequently asked 
questions.104 
 
The inquiry stated that each investigation would be undertaken using a range 
of methods, including the use of statutory powers to obtain relevant 
evidence “such as gathering witness statements and reviewing official 
records”.105 Investigations would conclude with a public hearing and a report 
that would set out the inquiry’s findings and any recommendations.  
 
The inquiry’s interim report made recommendations based on its findings at 
the time of its publication.106 The Government stated in November 2018 
that it welcomed the interim report and that it would consider its 
recommendations and publish a response “shortly”.107 
 
4. Parliament and the Work of the Independent Inquiry into Child 
Sexual Abuse 
 
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 
 
The House of Commons Home Affairs Committee considered the work of 
the IICSA in a report published on 24 November 2016.108 The committee 
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principally commented on developments in light of the resignation of Dame 
Lowell Goddard; the IICSA’s duty of care to those working on the inquiry; 
and role of the Home Affairs Committee in scrutinising the work of the 
IICSA.  
 
On the functioning of the IICSA more generally, the committee described 
the truth project as “an important way to enable abuse survivors to share 
their experiences with the inquiry”.109 However, it was critical of what it 
described as the IICSA’s slow progress to date in “engaging directly with 
survivors”.110 The committee believed that this was a significant weakness in 
the IICSA’s work at the time of the report’s publication, which was prior to 
the publication of the IICSA’s internal review.  
 
The committee noted the IICSA’s 13 investigations, stating that it believed 
the inquiry’s terms of reference were broad enough to include both historic 
and thematic investigations: 
 
The terms of reference for the inquiry are broad enough to include 
both specific investigations into historic events, which would lend 
themselves to the judicial approach, and thematic assessments of 
current institutional policies and practices, which lend themselves to 
the inspectorate-style approach.111 
 
The committee described the work of the inquiry as vital and said that it was 
important that it “is able to conduct forensic and legal investigations into 
historic abuse within institutional settings”.112 
 
The Government provided a response to the committee by letter on 
24 January 2017.113 The Government described the IICSA as an “opportunity 
to get to the truth, expose what has gone wrong and learn lessons for the 
future”.114 
 
House of Lords Oral Question 
 
On 22 November 2018, Lord Campbell-Savours (Labour) asked whether the 
Government had plans to amend the Inquiries Act 2005 to make specific 
provisions for the conduct of inquiries into child sexual abuse.115 Referring to 
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the IICSA’s investigative strand—in particular its investigation into 
institutional responses to allegations of child sexual abuse involving the late 
Lord Janner of Braunstone QC116—Lord Campbell-Savours expressed 
concern about the evidence that would be considered by the IICSA. 
Responding, Baroness Vere of Norbiton, a Government Whip, said that the 
Government did not intend to make any amendments in this regard, arguing 
that: 
 
The Inquiries Act 2005 and the Inquiry Rules 2006 that underpin it 
provide a robust and effective framework for the conduct of public 
inquiries. We do not see a need to make special provision for 
conducting inquiries into specific matters such as child sex abuse.117 
 
She said that it was not the role of government to interfere in statutory 
inquiries, as this would undermine their independence. Baroness Vere 
referred to notices of determination about the investigation, published on 
the IICSA’s website in April and May 2017, stating that “these summarise 
submissions received by the chair and decisions subsequently taken, and they 
confirm the inquiry’s position on this strand as being kept under review”.118 
 
5. Further Information: Links to Useful Resources 
 
• Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, ‘Preliminary 
Hearings Frequently Asked Questions’, accessed 12 December 
2018 
• Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, ‘Inquiry Protocol 
on Redaction of Documents: Version 3’, 25 July 2018 
• Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Inquiries Act 2005: 
Restriction Order Pursuant to Section 19(2)(b), 23 March 2018 
• Cabinet Office, Inquiries Guidance: Guidance for Inquiry Chairs and 
Secretaries, and Sponsor Departments, 2012119 
• National Audit Office, Investigation into Government-Funded 
Inquiries, 23 May 2018, HC 836 of session 2017–19 
• House of Commons Library, The Independent Inquiry into Child 
Sexual Abuse and Background, 11 August 2016 
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• House of Commons Library, The Inquiries Act 2005, 30 January 
2018 
• House of Lords Library, Historical Child Sex Abuse Investigations, 
27 June 2016 
• House of Lords Library, Work of the Ad Hoc Committees in  
2013–14, 20 January 2016 
• Institute for Government, How Public Inquiries Can Lead to Change, 
December 2017 
• Ministry of Justice, Memorandum to the Justice Select Committee: 
Post-Legislative Assessment of the Inquiries Act 2005, October 2010, 
Cm 7943 
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Appendix I: Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse: Terms 
of Reference 
 
Purpose 
 
1. To consider the extent to which state and non-
state institutions have failed in their duty of care to protect 
children from sexual abuse and exploitation; to consider the 
extent to which those failings have since been addressed; to 
identify further action needed to address any failings identified; to 
consider the steps which it is necessary for state and non-state 
institutions to take in order to protect children from such abuse 
in future; and to publish a report with recommendations. 
 
2. In doing so to: 
 
• Consider all the information which is available from the 
various published and unpublished reviews, court cases, 
and investigations which have so far concluded; 
• Consider the experience of survivors of child sexual abuse; 
providing opportunities for them to bear witness to the 
Inquiry, having regard to the need to provide appropriate 
support in doing so; 
• Consider whether state and non-state institutions failed to 
identify such abuse and/or whether there was otherwise an 
inappropriate institutional response to allegations of child 
sexual abuse and/or whether there were ineffective child 
protection procedures in place; 
• Advise on any further action needed to address any 
institutional protection gaps within current child protection 
systems on the basis of the findings and lessons learnt from 
this inquiry; 
• Disclose, where appropriate and in line with security and 
data protection protocols, any documents which were 
considered as part of the inquiry; 
• Liaise with ongoing inquiries, including those currently 
being conducted in Northern Ireland and Scotland, with a 
view to (a) ensuring that relevant information is shared, 
and (b) identifying any state or non-state institutions with 
child protection obligations that currently fall outside the 
scope of the present Inquiry and those being conducted in 
the devolved jurisdictions; 
• Produce regular reports, and an interim report by the end 
of 2018; and 
• Conduct the work of the Inquiry in [as] transparent a 
manner as possible, consistent with the effective 
investigation of the matters falling within the terms of 
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reference, and having regard to all the relevant duties of 
confidentiality. 
 
Scope 
 
3. State and non-state institutions. Such institutions will, for 
example, include: 
 
• Government departments, the Cabinet Office, Parliament 
and Ministers; 
• Police, prosecuting authorities, schools including private 
and state-funded boarding and day schools, specialist 
education (such as music tuition), local authorities 
(including care homes and children’s services), health 
services, and prisons/secure estates; 
• Churches and other religious denominations and 
organisations; 
• Political parties; and 
• The armed services. 
 
4. The Inquiry will cover England and Wales. Should the Inquiry 
identify any material relating to the devolved administrations, it 
will be passed to the relevant authorities; 
5. The Inquiry will not address allegations relating to events in 
the Overseas Territories or Crown Dependencies. However, 
any such allegations received by the Inquiry will be referred to 
the relevant law enforcement bodies in those jurisdictions; 
6. For the purposes of this Inquiry “child” means anyone under the 
age of 18. However, the panel will consider abuse of individuals 
over the age of 18, if that abuse started when the individual was 
a minor. 
 
Principles 
 
7. The Inquiry will have full access to all the material it seeks. 
8. Any allegation of child abuse received by the Inquiry will be 
referred to the police; 
9. All personal and sensitive information will be appropriately 
protected; and will be made available only to those who need to 
see it; and 
10. It is not part of the Inquiry’s function to determine civil or 
criminal liability of named individuals or organisations. This 
should not, however, inhibit the Inquiry from reaching findings of 
fact relevant to its terms of reference. 
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Appendix II: Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse: Current 
Investigations 
 
• Accountability and Reparations for Victims and Survivors of 
Abuse 
An inquiry into the extent to which existing support services and 
available legal processes effectively deliver reparations to victims and 
survivors of child sexual abuse and exploitation. 
• Cambridge House, Knowl View and Rochdale 
An inquiry into allegations of the sexual abuse and exploitation of 
children residing at or attending Cambridge House Boys’ Hostel, Knowl 
View School, and other institutions where their placement was 
arranged or provided by Rochdale Borough Council. 
• The Sexual Abuse of Children in Custodial Institutions 
An inquiry into the extent of any institutional failures to protect 
children from sexual abuse and exploitation while in custodial 
institutions. 
• Protection of Children Outside the UK 
An inquiry into the extent to which institutions and organisations based 
in England and Wales have taken seriously their responsibilities to 
protect children outside the United Kingdom from sexual abuse. 
• Child Sexual Exploitation by Organised Networks 
An inquiry into institutional responses to the sexual exploitation of 
children by organised networks. 
• Investigation into Institutional Responses to Allegations 
Concerning Lord Janner 
An inquiry into the institutional responses to allegations of child sexual 
abuse involving the late Lord Janner of Braunstone QC. 
• Children in the Care of Lambeth Council 
An inquiry into the extent of any institutional failures to protect 
children in the care of Lambeth Council from sexual abuse and 
exploitation. 
• Children in the Care of Nottinghamshire Councils 
An inquiry into the extent of any institutional failures to protect 
children in the care of Nottingham City and Nottinghamshire Councils 
from sexual abuse and exploitation. 
• Child Sexual Abuse in Residential Schools 
An inquiry into the sexual abuse and exploitation of children in 
residential schools. 
• Child Sexual Abuse in the Anglican Church 
An inquiry into the extent of any institutional failures to protect 
children from sexual abuse within the Anglican Church. 
• The Internet and Child Sexual Abuse 
An inquiry into institutional responses to child sexual abuse and 
exploitation facilitated by the internet. 
House of Lords Library Briefing   I   IICSA         29 
• Child Sexual Abuse in the Roman Catholic Church 
An inquiry into the extent of any institutional failures to protect 
children from sexual abuse within the Roman Catholic Church in 
England and Wales. 
• Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse Linked to Westminster 
An overarching inquiry into allegations of child sexual abuse and 
exploitation involving people of public prominence associated with 
Westminster.120 
 
                                            
120
 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, ‘Current Investigations’, accessed 
10 December 2018. 
